Jubilant Hungarians celebrated the end of Viktor Orban’s 16-year rule 12-April-2026. But what does it mean? This may not just be a defeat for Orban and a victory for Peter Magyar’s Tisza party, but it may turn out to be the most consequential election outcome for Europe and the U.S.A. far-right politics which looks up to Orban as a mentor. Orban’s illiberal model had turned into a blueprint for the illiberal democracy ideological model and far-right movements in Europe and the Trump Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement.

It might take some time before the impact of Orban’s defeat is fully appreciated. However, for many Hungarians the defeat of Orban means the restoration of sovereignty, restoration of a free media and accountability, transparency and countering elitism. In a Western space increasingly receptive to and threatened by far-right politics, many progressive figures hope the defeat of Orban severs the most direct political and organisational link between European right-wing forces and US president Donald Trump’s MAGA movement.

Illiberal democracy was not by accident in Hungary but a well-orchestrated Orban societal organisation modelling; the transformation was an intentional reaction to his reservations over the impact of liberal society. He made his views clear in a speech before an audience of mainly ethnic Hungarians at the 25th Bálványos Free Summer University in Romania’s Transylvania region in 2014, where he declared that Hungary had abandoned the liberal principles of societal organisation and, in the footsteps of “international stars” such as China, Singapore, Turkey and Russia, would adopt an illiberal form of governance. He reasoned, in the absence of objective evidence, that liberalism promoted selfish interests among (often unpatriotic) individuals, and only an illiberal democracy can devotedly serve the general interest of the whole nation.

Consequences of the Orbán illiberalism model have been the erosion of judicial independence, establishment of state-controlled media outlets, and extensive manipulation of the political narrative. Constant attacks on independent media and opinions referring to them as ‘fake news’. The effects of this approach have been the erosion of the very essence of a democratic society that relies heavily on objective truth and a plurality of voices to maintain accountability in governance.

To understand how Orban was able to easily and successfully carry out his vision of an illiberal political model, one would need to understand Hungarian society. As a former USSR member, Hungary’s psyching pivoted toward state-controlled systems; the regime changes of 1989 and 1990 led to fundamental changes in the political system, and socioeconomic structure. The country shifted from a one-party state to a pluralist democracy; from a planned to a market-orientated economy leading to the privatisation of state-owned property. The consequence of the economic structure transformation was evident on the labour market and employment changes that gave rise to unemployment and a shrinking of the working population, and a social structure transformation characterised by widening inequality. Compared to the relatively equal society during the USSR times, between 12-15% of the population controlled the economic wealth while the majority was poor or teetering toward poverty.

Orban and his Fidesz party as pioneers of illiberal democracy have been peddling the false narrative that liberalism and Western liberal democracies are the enemy of the people and Hungary, and Putin and Russia as the friend of Hungarians.

In the West, the far-right movements have developed a knack for hijacking legitimate socioeconomic and political challenges to interfere with the society’s operations and normalise bigotry thereby breaking the expected public journey in dealing with structural challenges that affect their lives; this has resulted in frustration and targeting of vulnerable members of society, e.g. immigrants, minority population groups, etc.

Such practices as hijacking legitimate public concerns about widening income inequality and narrowing of the job market for elites’ political gain undermine public trust in politics and break the expectations people have of how government should work.

While the result of Hungary’s parliamentary ballot may have dealt the far right a blow, this may mark a wakeup call than the beginning of the death of that enterprise. It would be simplistic to believe it marks a turn of the national-populist tide. Orbán’s defeat was not the defeat of his illiberal ideological model that is a blueprint for how governing far-right parties can organise a democracy.

It is too soon to say that Hungarian voters were driven by the desire to rid the country of Orban’s illiberal democracy model. However, what is certain is that Hungarians were driven by practical and domestic issues – anger at corruption benefitting Orbán’s allies; frustration with high prices, low wages and deteriorating public services including education and health; and a natural desire for change after 16 years of Orbán rule.

Foundations that drive the far-right success electorally are domestic issues such as migration narratives, promises of low prices, local ownership and control of resources; there is no objective reason to believe this far-right base was defeated, rather all evidence points as the defeat of Orbán’s kleptocratic, clientelistic, corrupt government.

Time will tell how impactful the Orban defeat would be to nationalist, far-right political movements in Europe and the U.S.A. While it indisputable that the Hungary election result illustrates the far right, as a structural force in Europe can be defeated, it neither offers a template for how to beat them elsewhere nor mark a general turning point.