Prominent socio-political scholars in Africa appear to advocate views opposed to nonrecognition of coup d’états (coups) as legitimate means of the change of power. These scholars sanitize latest coups in the Sahel region (at least 10 attempts between 2020 and 2024) which they conveniently call revolutions and African Renaissances. This ideological refusal to insist on socio-political rigour normalises power grab by those with access to violent means. The objective of these scholars is to convince the ordinary citizen that we are in the grip of a Western democracy conspiracy, and that latest coups are liberation vessels.
Extraordinary deceit is employed by some scholars to justify coups driving the continent away from civilian rule; these scholars have put aside government accountability programmes and devoted their energies and resources to romanticise military juntas.
Africa does need to extricate itself from the colonialism legacy of extractive regimes and carve out institution paths that navigate its distinct terrain and associated challenges. But military coups are not the right tool for carving that path. Previous coups led to further coups and abuse of power, weak institutions infested with fraud, corruption, marginalisation and weakening of civil society.
Systemic weaknesses have left radical actors to be judges in their own cause.
The problem we have in Africa is not the people, but leaders who want to overstay in power…
Yoweri Museveni (1980)
Speaking to David Smith (1980) about the continent and leadership, Yoweri Museveni argued, “The problem we have in Africa is not the people, but leaders who want to overstay in power…”
Yet when he seized power in 1986 following a 5-year ruthless war against the Uganda government of Milton Obote, his first act was to ban political parties and postpone elections.
Over-intellectualising coups minimises their impact on victims; it manipulates and reframes public mindsets to perceive such machinations more favourably. Justifying coups sanitises socio-political immorality that undermines civilian leadership. While scholars may rationalise or legitimise coups, civilian casualties of these interventions tend not to.
Coups have been symptomatic of internal insecurity posed by armed groups, authoritarian civilian regimes, weak governments, poor economies, and foreign machinations.
Mali
Since declaring himself Mali president on May 24, 2021, – after the second successful coup following the initial coup that deposed President Aboubakar Keita on August 18, 2020 – Col Assimi Goïta extended the military rule to June 2022; in May 2024 he pushed elections to 2027 after holding a “national dialogue” not attended by most opposition parties. He has since sacked the civilian Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, and his government after his criticism of the junta’s lack of transparency about the return to democracy.
Guinea
On September 24, 2021, President Alpha Conde was overthrown by Captain Mamady Doumbouya (head of the Special Forces unit). The coup was triggered by Conde’s unconstitutional change that would have allowed him to seek a third term in office. The military set December 2024 for power transfer to a civilian government.
Burkina Faso
Deteriorating security following the coup in Mali led to loss of vast Burkinabe territory to armed groups compromising the civilian government of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.
On January 24, 2022, Kaboré was deposed in a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henro Damiba. Worsening insecurity after the takeover (40 percent loss of territory to armed groups and heavy Burkinabe military losses on the battlefront) led to the overthrow of Damiba’s government on September 30, 2022 by a group of soldiers led by Captain Ibrahim Traore. In May 2024, Traore pushed elections to 2029.
Niger
July 26, 2023, President Mohamed Bazoum was dethroned by top army officials led by the chief presidential guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani. Security crisis due to Niger’s proximity to both Mali and Burkina Faso and direct threat to Tchiani’s post contributed to the coup. On assuming power Tchiani vowed to fight corruption.
Fast forward to February 23, 2024, he signed an order repealing all controls on military spending; the order states, “expenditure for the acquisition of equipment or materials or any other supplies, the performance of works or services for the defense and security forces […] shall be excluded from the scope of the legislation on public procurement and public accounting…”
Gen Tchiani has not set out a roadmap for return to civilian rule, instead, he has tightened his grip on power, suppressed opponents and the media.
Gabon
Morning after his election victory on August 30, 2023, President Ali Bongo Ondimba was deposed in a coup led by his cousin, Brigadier General Brice Oligui Nguema, who became president of the transitional government on September 4, 2023. Elections are scheduled for August 2025.
Widespread human rights abuses including arbitrary arrests and detentions of top civilian officials characterise politics in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, and Gabon. Except for pro-junta rallies, juntas have banned demonstrations by civil society organisations, opposition political parties and all protests.
Coups worsen than address governance problems; we need inclusive solutions to address the underlying factors which include weak government institutions, authoritarian regimes, insecurity, poverty, and dissatisfaction with former colonial rulers’ interference.
Conclusion
An attempt by African socio-political scholars to build, in our environment, tolerance for extra-constitutional or forced change of government to avoid confrontations with power-hungry military personnel is not a solution to weak and poor governance institutions. Instead of tolerating and normalising coups, we must tackle their main causes: undemocratic practices, weak governance institutions, weak civil society, lack of transparency, youth unemployment, chronic poverty bred by underperforming economies, and the legacy of colonialism.
MTHWAKAZI INDEPENDENT 