Recent resurgence for unconstitutional changes of government in West Africa is a concern for political and economic development in the region. Coup d’états have taken place over the last three years in the West African states of Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger being the latest. These have happened on the background of regional instability, poor governance by elected leaders, poverty, and poor economic performance.
Coup leaders and some political commentators justify their action on the need to rid the region of Western neocolonialism, its paternalistic attitude, and vengeful policies, and the urgent need to restore independence by removing, from power, current leaders accused of being Western puppets yet on gaining power the very first thing coup leaders have done is to replace foreign allies with others.
We note too that all military governments are still in place; there are no signs or a desire for the transfer of state institutions back to civilian control rather, they have further marginalised civilian society from power.
The issue of coups is quite contentious within the continent; views on recent coups, the causes and impact on fundamental institutions in Africa are highly subjective. For some commentators the recent resurgence of coups marks a paradigm shift away from Western political influence, and Africans taking ownership of their political destiny, but how true is that?
Evidence dispels the notion of a paradigm shift; apart from a decline in the beginning of the 21st Century, military coups in West Africa are not new and their benefit to civilian society has been negligible, if not non-existent. A study of over 200 coup attempts in Africa since the 1950s (see graph below) indicates a 50 percent success rate, where success is defined as a coup lasting more than seven days.
Although between 2021 and 2023 there has been a resurgence of coups, the reasons have not changed. The latest military takeover in Niger follows a string of coups in the continent in recent years. There were two in Burkina Faso in 2022 as well as failed coup attempts in Guinea Bissau, The Gambia and the island nation of Sao Tome and Principe. In 2021, there were six coup attempts in Africa, four of which were successful.
Causes of military takeovers are multilayered: perceived meddling of former colonial powers in internal matters, including propping up dictators in return for allegiance is often raised. But what is the contribution of foreign meddling compared to other factors – constitutional coups to change term limits, poverty, poor economic performance, corruption, tribalism, marginalisation of certain population groups and weak government institutions?
Although the evidence for the direct link between coups and the former colonial powers is arguably weak, since 1952 Nigeria (8), Ghana (10), Sierra Leone (10), and Sudan (17), all former British colonies have experienced the highest incidents. And since 1990, 78% of the 27 coups in sub-Saharan Africa have occurred in Francophone states leading some commentators to question whether France or the legacy of French colonialism was a significant contributory factor.
We argue that the rise in coups is retrogressive and a serious concern not only for the West African region but the whole continent. The ripple effects of the related instability are felt far and wide. Contrary to popular belief, reservations against military coups are not influenced by sympathy with the West but due to concerns that these interventions have not strengthened African civilian society.
Reality remains that coups in Africa do not represent progress and they do not improve governance because their purpose has always been to protect the privileges of the military elite, not to strengthen civil society and protect the poor from poverty and/ or its impact. A progressive Africa will need more, not less civilian control of organs of power, and security must subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation; the army must revert to its role of defending society from foreign invaders, not to define it.
If the military continues to define the political landscape, protection of power, and not people from its abuse, will be top of the agenda. Priorities of recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are unmistakeable and clearly not to transfer power to civilian control; they want more, not less military control of society. This is well demonstrated by the speed with which these new military coup leaders have sought to replace one unfavourable relationship with an external ally with another.
We need to be honest with ourselves about the association between institutional decay and triggers of coups. There is no denying that some overinvolvement of former colonial powers has a negative effect on local politics including weakening government institutions by propping up dictators hence coups, but Africa has largely failed itself. For far too long, African countries have left conditions common for coups such as poverty and poor economic performance unaddressed. African society must carry the burden of responsibility; civilian society has become too weak to deal with the corrupt world of Africa politics, and it has allowed itself to be held hostage by the military and lies of politicians who point a finger to the West every time accountability is demanded. The cowardly civilian society has oftentimes found itself legitimising conduct of politicians lacking in moral dignity or human decency to stand up to the poisonous and divisive policies that marginalise certain population groups.
MTHWAKAZI INDEPENDENT 